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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
P ARLAN McFARLANE, also known as 
PARLANE McFARLAND, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GLENN WINTERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELL~~ BRIEF 
STATEMENT- OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff and respondent brought this action in the 
District Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, to recover 
from the defendant and appellant the sum of $2,299.25, to-
gether with interest thereon at the rate of S<fo per annum 
from the 1st day of May, 1939, and plaintiff's costs. The 
Complaint alleges that on the 1st day of May, 1939, the 
plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant in the sum 
of $1,381.40, together with interest in the sum of $905.00 
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and costs in the sum of $17.80, making a total judgment of 
$2,299.25, and that said sum had borne interest at the rate 
of S% per annum from May 1, 1939 to May 1, 1947, when 
the Complaint was filed, and for that amount judgment was 
prayed. To that Complaint the defendant and appellant 
answered in his first defense that the plaintiff in the action 
was dead, and that he had been dead for more than twenty 
years prior to the commencement of the action. In his second 
defense he states that the action is barred by the provisions 
of Sections 104-2-21 and 104-2-38 of the Utah Code Annotated 
of 1943. For his third defense he pleads that on September 
28, 1914 in case number 1050 between the same parties, judg-
ment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant for the sum of $488.50, and that on September 7, 
1922, an action was brought to renew the judgment and a 
judgment was entered by default in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant for the sum of $1380.40. He then 
pleads that that judgment was void for the reason that the 
defendant and appellant was never served with summons in 
said action, and that the court acquired no jurisdiction of the 
defendant; that the Sheriff's return of said Summons stated 
that he served it upon the defendant by leaving a copy of the 
Summons with Mrs. W. P. Winters at Price, Utah, at the 
usual place of abode of the defendant on September 15, 1922, 
and he alleges that Price, Carbon County, Utah, was not and 
never had been the usual place of abode of the defendant and 
appellant, but that his usual place of abode at that time was 
Sanpete County, State of Utah; that on May 1, 1939, the same 
action was brounght in the court of Sanpete County for the 
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renewal of said judgment and wherein a judgment was obtained 
for the sum of $2299.25, which the defendant alleges is a 
void judgment by reason that the former judgment heretofore 
referred to was void for lack of service of Summons, and the 
defendant alleges that an attempt to renew the judgment in 
the present action was void for the reason that the judgment 
which was attempted to be renewed was void and of no force 
and effect. The first judgment obtained for the sum of $488.50 
was the result of an automobile collision in 1914 on September 
28th. This being true, it is shown that this is the fourth time 
the judgment has been sued upon for renewal. In the action 
the plaintiff prays for judgment in the sum of $2299.25, to-
gether with interest at 8lfo from the 1st day of May 1939, 
and the defendant prays in his Answer that the plaintiff take 
nothing upon his said Complaint, but that the same be dis-
missed and that the defendant recover his costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The defendant and appellant appeals from the judgment 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and respondent for the sum 
of $2299.25, together with interest upon said sum, basing his 
claim principally on the allegations of his first defense to the 
effect that the plaintiff in the action is dead, and that he has 
been dead for more than twenty years prior to the commence-
ment of the action. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Comes now the defendant and appellant and makes the 
following assignments of error upon which he will rely for 
a reversal of judgment appealed from in this cause: 
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1. The court erred in the computation of interest in the 
entry of said judgment, it being shown that the first judgment 
obtained against the defendant and appellant was the sum 
of $488.50, and that when that judgment was renewed, it 
was renewed for the principal sum, plus interest on said sum 
at the legal rate during the time subsequent to the entry of the 
first judgment. From that time on the record shows that the 
interest has been compounded every time the judgment has 
been renewed at least four times since the entry of the first 
judgment, and that the greater portion of the judgment now 
entered is a judgment for interest compounded upon interest. 
2. The Court erred in denying the defendant and appel-
lant judgment in the trial of said action in the District Court 
and in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and re-
spondent in said action. 
3. The court erred m denying defendant's motion for 
new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
The evidence in this case shows in effect the following 
facts: 
That the plaintiff obtained a judgment in 1914 against 
the defendant for the sum of $488.50, no part of this judg-
ment has ever been paid. If it were to run at straight 8o/o 
interest from the date of its entry to the present time, there 
would be accumulated in interest the sum of $1328.72, add 
the principal sum of $488.50 to that sum and it gives a total 
of $1817.22. However, by compounding this interest every 
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8 years and charging interest upon interest, a judgment in this 
case, if there is a judgment in this case, has accumulated to the 
sum of approximately $4,000.00. We say that such a pro-
cedure is not intended by our statute or justified thereby, and 
should not be permitted to be carried through in the manner 
applied by the court in this action. 
We refer to Section 44-0-4 of the 1943 Annotated Code: 
"Interest on Judgments. Any judgment rendered 
on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall 
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties which shall 
be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall 
bear interest at the rate of B7o per annum." (Italics 
ours.) 
It is just a little difficult to conceive how, out of this 
situation, one would attempt to compound his interest every 
eight years when the judgment was renewed when the only 
action taken on the matter was the renewal of the judgment. 
One would hardly expect to take a note for six years at a 
specified interest and then if the note were not paid before 
the statute of limitation run upon it, and it was necessary to 
renew it, that the party making the note would be expected 
in that renewal to have the interest figured and added to the 
principal and then make a new principal out of the combined 
sum on a renewal note and have the entire combination then 
bear interest again at the rate of B7o per annum. It would 
appear to us that such a computation of interest would be a 
usurious enterprise, and that fact is definitely established when 
it is shown, as hereinabove, that a straight B7o interest on 
the judgment obtained for the full time would render the 
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total amount due now at approximately $1817.22, when the 
last judgment entered is for some $4,000.00, twice and one-
fourth the amount that the judgment should be. 
We, therefore, submit that the court erred in rendering 
judgment, as in this case rendered, for the amount specified 
therein. 
Assignment of error two goes to the important question in 
this case and that is as to whether or not the evidence supported 
the defendant's first defense that the plaintiff was dead and 
had been dead for more than twenty years prior to the com-
mencement of the action. 
We wish to refer to the testimony in the transcript on 
this particular point. Mrs. Anna C. McFarlane, a witness for 
the plaintiff testified that she was the former wife of the 
plaintiff in this action; that she last saw the plaintiff in 1921 
(T. p. 11), and that she had never seen nor heard from him 
since that time (T. p. 12); that she had received no written 
communication from him, had received no telegrams, no 
telephone conversations and no other word of any kind since 
1921 (T. p. 13; that she thinks he left home when he did 
leave because he was not contented, and because his family 
was a burden ti him (T. p. 14); that if her husband were alive 
now, he would be 63 years old; that he was born in 1884 
(T. p. 15). She stated that his mother received a card from 
him in 1941, a short time before his mother died; that she 
did not see the card, but she saw the envelope it was in; that 
she saw the handwriting on it, and it was the handwriting 
of her husband, Parlan McFarlane; that the envelope had a 
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California postmark on it (T. p. 18); that the envelope con-
tained a lvfother's Day card, and that it was sometime in May 
when she saw it (T. p. 19); that she did not see the card, but 
she saw the envelope; that the envelope was laying on the 
kitchen table in Mrs. Taylor's home in Manti (T. p. 20); that 
she did not see the card, but the envelope looked as though 
it had a card in it (T. p. 21); that she recognized the hand-
writing as that of her husband's (T. p. 22). 
It will be noted that this envelope-on-the-table transaction 
was twenty years after Farlan McFarlane had been gone and 
no word had been received from him by his wife or family. 
Wanda McFarlane Larsen testified that she was born 
October 18, 1916, and that she does not remember her father 
at all (T. p. 25). 
William McFarlane testified that he was a brother of 
Farlan McFarlane; that he had never seen him since he left 
Manti in 1921 (T. p. 28); that the only thing he had ever 
heard of him was that Bruce Axelson and Wilford Fishneck 
had brought some communication to him regarding his 
brother, Farlan McFarlane from California; that the mother 
of these boys died in July of 1941; that at the time Farlan Mc-
Farlane did not attend the funeral, did not send any word 
concerning the matter, in fact no word was received from him 
at all (T. p. 29 and 30); that Wilford Fishneck had told him 
that he had seen his brother in California in 1925, and that 
Ezra Madson from Ephraim has seen Farlan McFarlane in 
California in 1929 (T. p. 31). At that time he was running 
a paint shop and that he requested that no word be given his 
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family about him; that he, William McFarlane, had been fur-
nishing money to renew the judgments on this particular 
lawsuit ever since the first judgment was entered in favor of 
his brother, and that he had done so without any request or 
suggestion from his brother, the plaintiff, whatsoever (T. p. 
32); that he had in like manner renewed the judgment at 
least three times and perhaps four (T. p. 33). He testified 
that he had seen a card sent to his mother on Mother's Day 
by his brother Farlan McFarlane; that he identified the card 
by the handwriting on the envelope addressed to his mother 
(T. p. 35); that he took care of his mother's correspondence 
(T. p. 36). He stated that the envelope was dated, but the 
card was not. There was nothing on the card; that he does 
not know where the card is (T. p. 37); that the address on the 
envelope was in his brother's handwriting; that he could tell 
his brother's handwriting because, as he said, "I can write 
and you can tell my handwriting anytime, and I can tell a 
McFarlane handwriting." That there was some checks in 
the possession of his wife signed by him, but no comparison 
of those checks were made. (T. p. 38). That it was written 
in indelible pencil, and that the only thing he noticed about 
it was a postmark from California (T. p. 39). 
Wilford Frischnecht, a witness for the plaintiff testified 
that he saw Farlan McFarlane in Oakland, California in 1925 
(T. p. 65). 
Bruce Axelson testified that he saw Farlan McFarlane in 
San Francisco in 1928 or 1929 (A. p. 66); that it was on How-
ard Street between 3rd or 4th; that he went down there to 
get a bus on their way to Los Angeles, but he did not do much 
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talking to him, but that his brother did. He said he was 
going on a paint job out at Palo Alto (T. p. 67); that on Cross 
Examination, the witness testified that he knew Parlan Me~ 
Farlane as a young boy, but admi'tted that he left Manti when 
the witness was but 8 years of age; that the last time he talked: 
to him he asked if his mother was still alive and asked how 
Bill was; that he first denied being Parlan McFarlane, qut 
after talking to him a little while he asked if his mother was, 
still alive, but he never stated who his mother was to wh_q!Jl 
he was referring (T. p. 72). . "" 
A Louise Cox, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that she 
thought she saw Parlan McFarlane last summer in Provo 
(T. p. 73); that she and her daughter were walking up the 
street in Provo and they saw a man whom they thought. was 
Parlan McFarlane; that he had cotton on his eye and dark 
glasses over the cotton; one eye being bandaged (T. p. 82 and, 
83). That he did not recognize them, and the witness testi-
fied that she thought it was because he did not want to recog-
nize them (T. p. 83 and 84). 
As we view the testimony, the only testimony there is 
of Parlan McFarlane being in existence within the statutory 
period of the last eight years, is the fact, that certain people 
saw an envelope laying on the table in his mother's home that 
had a card on it that had no handwriting whatsoever; that it 
had an address to his mother with a California postmark on it, 
and the testimony of this Mrs. Cox who says she saw him in 
Provo; that is the only testimony that seems to bring us within 
the perview of the statutory period of seven years after which 
a person is presumed to be dead, and we do not believe that 
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the testimony is sufficient upon which to base a judgment, 
certainly it would s'eem strange if the man Mrs. Cox saw in 
Provo was him, that no relative in Utah saw him at that time, 
and though she testified that the man was wearing working 
clothes, indicating that he was employed in or around about 
Provo, and then this mysterious card that these people saw 
but no one could produce, although it must be remembered 
that William McFarlane knew about this judgment and had 
paid the costs of those renewals some three times up to that 
time, and yet he did not feel that the card was of any impor-
tance or significance in establishing that his brother was still 
alive. We do not believe that such evidence would 
supply the burden of proof required of the plaintiff to support 
a judgment in an action brought for that purpose. 
In opposition to this slight evidence, we have the evidence 
of the defendant, Glenn Winters, who testified that he had seen 
Parlan McFarlane around the streets in Mount Pleasant; that 
he was at the first trial of the case and saw him at that time; 
that he had made an effort to locate Parlan McFarlane prior 
to the last trial of this action ( T. p. 42) ; that he had inquired 
of Will McFarlane and Mrs. McFarlane (Parlan McFarlane's 
wife) ; that his wife had told him that she had last heard from 
him in Salt Lake City; that he contacted the Police Department 
of Salt Lake City, but that they could not find him; that he 
had the bookkeeper of the Utah Power & Light Company 
search their records back 2 5 to 26 years and they could find 
nothing concerning Parlan McFarlane; that he had the tele-
phone directory of Salt Lake City and the City Directory 
searched (T. p. 43), also, the register of Vital Statistics; that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1) 
he had made inquiries in San Francisco and Ely, Nevada, and 
other places; that he had directed letters be sent to practically 
every County Seat west of Mississippi River, all that they 
could find, and that they had written the Peace Officers in 
all of those cities requesting that a search be made for him, 
all of which was of no avail (T. p. 44); that he had <:ontacted 
the Eastman Kodak people of San Francisco for the reason 
that Farlan McFarlane was in the photography business in 
Mount Pleasant; that of all the inquiries he made, he received 
back only two replies which were marked Exhibits "A" and 
"B" and are part of the record; that he had. a search made 
through the United Mine Workers of America through their 
Welfare Department, but could find no trace of him (T. p. 46); 
that he has three cousins in San Francisco, and he had them 
make a search of San Francisco to see if they could locate him, 
and they could find no trace of him in San Francisco T. p. 47). 
We, therefore, submit that the evidence in this case shows 
that Farlan McFarlane, plaintiff, is, as a matter of law, dead, 
and that he did not authorize any one nor did anyone have 
any right to bring this action on his behalf. 
Concerning the legal proposition that absence creates a pre~ 
sumption of death, we refer to the following authorities: 
17 Corpus Juris, 1166, which reads as follows: 
"The presumption of the continuance of life is 
overcome or displaced by the presumption of death 
which arises from the unexplained absence from the 
person from his last or usual place of residence for a 
sufficiently long period of time without having been 
heard of during such period . . . The presumption 
of death from unexplained absence is not, however, 
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a presumption of law, but a mixed presumption of law 
and fact which may be rebutted, and it will not be 
indulged where the circumstances of the cast are such 
to account for· the absence of the person without as-
suming his death, and it has been held that he who 
relies upon an unexplained absence must not only 
prove it, but must also produce evidence to justify 
the inference that death is the probable reason why 
nothing is known about the missing persor; " 
Concerning the length of absence, we quote from 17 
Corp, Juris 1167: 
"At common law the rule was that a presumption 
of death arose from an unexplained absence of seven 
years, and this is the rule which prevails in nearly all 
jurisdictions, although in a few jurisdiction:; a shorter 
period has been prescribed by statute." 
Quoting now from Jones Commentaries of Evidence 
Vol. 1, page 473, we have the following: 
"It is thus stated in the Massachusetts case, that if 
a man leaves his home and goes into parts unknown and 
remains unheard from for the space of 7 years, the 
law authorizes to those that remain, the presumption 
of fact that he is dead, but it does not authorize him 
to presume therefore that any one of those remaining 
in the place which he left has died." 
Again on page 476, we have the following: 
"It need hardly be added that this pre~urnption of 
death from absence is not a conclusive pcesumpt10n. 
It is one of fact, and is subject to be controlled by the 
facts of the case. It is one which varies in weight a('-
cording to the circumstances. The presumption may 
be rebutted in the same manner as any other presump-
tion of fact by proof of circumstances which are in-
consistant with its existence as a logical conclusion." 
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Of course, there is nothing in this case that will meet such 
a situation. 
Again on page 477 of the same volume: 
"Evidence having been adduced sufficient to create 
a presumption of death from absence of the missing 
person for seven years or more, unaccompanied by ch-
cumstances accounting for such absence on any 
hypothesis other than death, the burden of rebutting 
such presumption devolves upon the party asserting 
the continuance of life ... but it is not rebuttable on 
mere rumor, it must be evidence of a tangible nature 
such as a declaration of an intention to leave the horne 
for some good reason ... It may be that if the eviden~e 
here offered had been admitted (a general report 
among the absentee's friends that he was living) tl1e 
eros examination would have shown it to be mere vague 
rumor, and if so, unworthy of credit, but if there was 
such report and intelligence as to the absent man among 
his friends and former acquaintances as was offered to 
be shown, the weight to be given it was for the jury." 
In the case of St. Martin vs. Hendershott, an Oregon case, 
160 Pac. 373 at page 374: 
''Isaac Arquette, so far as known, had no lineal 
descendents, and since he has not been heard from by 
his acquaintances or any member of his family for 
more than seven years, he is therefore presumed to be 
dead.'' 
ln the case of American National Insurance Company 
vs. Hattie Hicks, 75 A.L.R. 623, quoting from the syllabus, 
we have the following: 
"Where, while a life insurance policy was in force, 
the insured, whose family relations were happy and 
who had no known enemies disappeared, and was not 
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again heard from, the trial court in an action broughL 
after the expiration of seven years has created a pn.~­
sumption of death is warranted in fi.ndmg that the 
death occurred before the policy had lapsed by reason 
of non-payment of premiums." 
And then quoting from the decision at page 629, we have 
the following: 
"The fact that death after an absence of seven year.:, 
successively, by a person is fixed by the statute when 
the fact of absence is established as was done in th1s 
case, but the time of death of such individual must be 
determined by the jury or by the court in trying tbe 
case without the intervention of a jury." Soverign 
Camp W. 0. W. vs. Boden, 117 Texas 229; 1 SW 
(2nd) 256; 61 AIR 682. 
In the case of Kansas City Life Insurance Company vs. 
Dora Marshall, 61 A.L.R. 1321, quoting from the syllabus, 
we have the following: 
"The death of an unheard of absentee may likely 
be presumed from evidence of facts and circumstances 
other than those showing exposure to danger which 
probably resulted or might probably have resulted 
in his death without regard to the duration of the 
absence, and that some time before the expiration of 
the seven year period." 
Again in the case of Lulu L. Goodier vs. Mutual Life 
Insurance Company of New York, 34 A. L. R. 1383, quoting 
from the syllabus, we have the following: 
"The presumption of continued life of one who has 
disappeared from his home and the knowledge of 
his family, in the absence of proof to the contrary, 
continues for seven years. At the end of that time 
and not until then it ceases to operate, and the pre-
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sumption of death takes its place. The latter pre· 
sumption is to the effect only that the missing one is not 
then alive and does not prove death at any precise 
time within the seven year period." 
Quoting from the case at page 1387, we have the follow-
rng: 
"The presumption of death attending disappearance 
followed by 7 year's absence with no tidings of the 
missing one and no evidence that he has been seen 
alive during that period, does not help plaintiff. The 
presumption cannot be permitted to show death at any 
time within the 7 year period. It comes into operation 
at the end of 7 years absence simply as a logical sub-
stitution for the presumption of continued life which 
at that moment ceases to operate. Certainly the in-
ference of death after seven years cannot by itself 
prove death before that time. The rule of the pre-
sumption extends merely to the fact that death from 
and after the end of the period. It is not understood 
to specify anything further-for example the time of 
death within that period." Wigmore ev. Section 2531: 
·'Where, in a note the authorities are gone into at 
length. (The irreconcible conflict of authority as to 
whether or not the presumption of death from absence 
raises any presumption as to the precise time of death 
is dealt with in the annotation of Butler vs. Supreme 
Court, 53 Washington 118, 101 Pac. 481.) 
In the case of Benjamin vs. District Grand Lodge So. 4, 
Independent Order B'nai B'Rith, 152 Pac. 731, again quoting 
from the syllabus: 
"Where to prove the fact of insured's death, the 
presumption under Code of Civil Procedure, Section 
1963, subdivision 26, that a person not heard from in 
seven years is dead, must be relied on. The cause of 
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action on the benefit certificate providing for payment 
on satisfactory evidence of his death does not arise 
until lapse of such time." 
In the case of the Praetorians vs. Phillips, 88 Pac. 2nd 
647 at 650, we have the following: 
"It will thus be seen that the general rule is that 
where a person disappears and is not heard from for 
a period of seven years, upon a showing of due dili-
gence, search and inquiry, it will be presumed that 
he is dead. This alone, however, will not give rise 
to a presumption that such person died prior to the 
last day of said 7 year period or at any particular time 
within said period." 
In the case of Fink vs. Prudential Insurance Company of 
America, 90 Pac. 2nd, at page 762, quoting from syllabus No. 
6, we have the following: 
"Disputable presumption enumerated in statute that 
one not heard from in 7 years is dead was not intended 
to create new rule concerning effect of 7 years un-
explained absence, but was merely intended to state 
the existing law. 
Syllabus No. 7: 
"The rule permitting inference of death from 7 
years unexplained absence is a rule of necessity. 
Syllabus No. 9: 
"In absence of special circumstances such as old age, 
search and inquiry promptly instituted and prosecuted 
with reasonable diligence are requisites to a pre-
sumption of death rule. 
There can be no question at all concerning the presump-
tion of death of a party who has been absent and unheard of 
for the 7 year period, and there too can be no question of a 
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party's right to proceed in cases such as the case at bar on such 
a presumption. 
Let us not lose track of the situation in this case under 
which the plaintiff left his home, his wife and his family. 
The evidence does not show that there was any family trouble 
that had existed between him and his wife prior to his leaving 
home, no more than ordinary difficulties that arise in any 
home where the marital relations exist and are operating. The 
evidence shows that the plaintiff in this action did not leave 
home because of any trouble with his wife or family, but left 
his home in quest of a job and never returned. Viewing the 
evidence we have referred to as being the evidence introduced 
at the trial of this case of a continued life of the plaintiff, it 
seems inconceivable that a man would leave his family con-
sisting of a wife and several small children on the pretext of 
going to find employment and then never contacting them 
again either by visit, correspondence or in any other manner for 
a period of more than 25 years, and then to address a Mother's 
Day card to his mother, under the cimcumstances attending 
such sending of such card as divulged by the evidence, a plain 
card in an envelope without a word of writing upon it to his 
mother with whom he had had no difficulty whatsoever, ad-
dressing it to her merely as "Mrs." and eliminating her first 
name, with no return address upon it, such procedure seems 
absolutely unexplainable, and particularly the identification on 
the pencilled writing on the envelope by a man who had aged 
from 25 to 30 years since anyone of them had seen him or seen 
his handwriting, and then the absence of the document in 
evidence at the time of the trial of this case. Let us not forget 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinn y Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institu e of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
that the brother who has carried on the litigation over all these 
long years testified that he saw the envelope and recognized 
his brother's handwritng thereupon, and yet he does not pr~· 
serve such evidence to present at the trial of the case to show 
that the presumption of death through the absence of his 
brother is untrue, and the evidence of Mrs. Cox who saw the 
man with the bandaged eye at Provo and testified that it was 
Parlan McFarlane and who was within three feet of him 
when she saw him and yet she did not stop him and he did 
not recognize her and she was never able to catch up to him 
to determine definitely his identity and yet he did not run, he 
walked up the street from the time she first saw him. It would 
seem inconceivable if the man she saw was Parlan McFarlane, 
and let us not lose track of the fact that he evidently was in 
working clothes indicating that he was employed at or near 
Provo, Utah, and yet with all of his friends and relatives so 
near to where he was, not one other person ever saw him even 
though may of these people were his relatives, and his wife 
and children were still in Sanpete County, living there. This 
being the only evidence the plaintiff has to overcome the pre-
sumption of his death, we cannot understand how such evidence 
could be received to overcome the presumption as we under-
stand the rule to be that a presumption takes substantial evi-
dence to overcome it. 
We then have the testimony of the defendant wherein it 
shows that he extended great effort by personal inquiry, by in-
numerable letters sent out and some to acquaintances in San 
Francisco who was acquainted with the plaintiff and who made 
a diligent search in San Francisco, but was unable to locate 
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him. His evidence of inquiry is substantial as against faint 
presumption upon the part of the plaintiff. 
We submit, therefore, that the court erred in granting 
judgment for the plaintiff in this case, and that the judgment 
so entered should be, by this court, reversed and 1:emanded to 
the District Court of Sanpete County, with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of the defendant-no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. LeROY SHIELDS 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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